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Introduction 
 
Recently, two fundamentals of banking operations have received widespread attention from 
regulators and markets: capital and liquidity. Aggregated microeconomic inadequacies in 
these two variables generated systemic financial instability which led to the most costly and 
globalised crisis since the Great Depression (Claessens et. al., 2010). 
Anomalously, few studies have examined the direct impact of capital adequacy and liquidity 
on banking crisis probabilities2 and certainly none, to our knowledge, on Latin American and 
Asian banking systems. Since tighter international standards in these variables are advocated 
by regulators, there should be a measurable reduction in banking crisis probabilities across 
regions, including in emerging markets. Without this, stricter capital and liquidity 
requirements may tax credit provision and cause more disintermediation in some regions 
compared to others.    
The banking crisis literature to date generates different and often conflicting conclusions 
some of which have been used to underpin policymakers’ changes to existing regulations3. 
Invariably such studies rely on diverse ranges of cross-sections, time periods, variables and 
estimators and yet, alternative models are not routinely compared in any systematic way; 
factors such as the type of estimator, the informational content of competing indicators and 
the forecasting value of models all have a bearing on regulators’ claims that stricter capital 
and liquidity standards are necessary to reduce future systemic failures. 
This paper addresses some of these deficiencies in the literature by focusing on the role of 
capital and liquidity specifically in Latin America and Asia. We have painstakingly collected 
capital adequacy data for a sample of 14 banking systems covering 1980 – 2010. As a 
preliminary assessment of these new series and “standard” crisis determinants we use an 
event study approach which identifies variables that behave significantly differently during 
periods of instability and tranquillity. 
Capital and liquidity are then introduced in a logit framework alongside standard banking 
crisis determinants to see if, as Basel III assumes, healthier capital and liquidity positions 
reduce crisis probabilities in these regions. We find that capital and liquidity do mitigate 
crises but only in a pooled sample since the relative importance of each differs between 
regions: in Latin America both capital and liquidity matter whereas in Asia, crises are 
associated with banks’ liquidity positions. 
We also find that capital and liquidity are not the only causes of crises in these economies. 
Unsurprisingly for these open and emerging markets, the terms of trade, current account 
positions and the level of banking system development also matter. Specifically, we find that 
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 an exception are Barrell et. al. (2010) who find capital and liquidity to be superior banking crisis predictors in 
the OECD than macro crisis determinants that were found significant in previous studies such as Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1999, 2005) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). These papers did not test the role of 
capital and liquidity. 
3
 see for example, Barrell et. al., (2010) versus Borio et. al. (2010) or Borio and Drehmann (2009) 
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Asian crises were preceded by balance of payments problems manifesting as current account 
and terms of trade deteriorations and capital outflows which compromised banking system 
liquidity. In Latin America, banking fragility was associated with the inadequate capital 
adequacy and liquidity positions of banks at a time when rising bank intermediation 
(domestic credit/ GDP) raised crisis probabilities.  
In investigating the roles of capital and liquidity we also address the role of credit. The view 
that credit growth is a cause of banking crises (and thus requires amelioration via policy 
responses) underpins the latest international countercyclical buffer proposals under Basel III. 
However, the evidence that rapid credit growth per se is problematic remains inconclusive 
even for OECD economies. This also appears to be the case in the context of Latin America 
and Asia since we do not identify credit growth as a leading crisis indicator in either region.  
These results are of interest to international policymakers charged with minimizing future 
crises. They are especially important for the regions we study, to establish whether the 
international rules they will be subject to are optimal based on their particular trade-offs 
between elevated capital and liquidity requirements and the associated output losses. The 
results also serve as an Early Warning System (EWS) for future crisis risks in these regions. 
To identify the best combination of leading indicators, we rank the informational content of 
our competing model specifications by their Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) characteristics. 
We use the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) to assess the “skill” of our EWSs. This 
assessment technique for binary event predictors identifies the optimal model in terms of its 
informational value (noise versus signal). 
Our results imply that capital and liquidity outperform many traditionally accepted crisis 
determinants. In addition, the ROC analysis reveals some variables are suited to predicting 
idiosyncratic crises. This suggests that global models containing many predictors may add 
limited value since the identification of distinctive episodes comes at the cost of a higher 
number of target variables and associated policy errors. A parsimonious model is able to 
discriminate between crisis and non-crisis episodes almost as well as a more protracted model 
containing predictors that are inefficient due to these costs. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on our variables 
of interest: capital and liquidity. Section 3 describes our data, the event study and logit 
methodologies and then discusses the ROC curve approach. Section 4 presents our results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
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Section 2: Capital, Liquidity and the Asian and Latin American Crises 
In this section we review the relationships between capital, liquidity and banking crises. Our 
remaining variables have been extensively discussed in the extant literature such as 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Davis and Karim (2008), Barrell et.al. (2010) and 
Davis, Karim and Liadze (2011). We then outline the events of the Asian and Latin American 
crises before turning to discussions of our data and methodologies in the subsequent section.  
 
2.1 The Role of Capital in Risk Reduction 
At its most basic level the rationale for capital buffers is intuitive and not unique to banking 
firms: by earmarking a portion of funds (capital) to cover deteriorations on the asset side of 
the balance sheet, a firm can reduce its insolvency rates. However designing practical rules to 
translate this into optimal capital ratios is not as intuitive for regulators. Since theory suggests 
capital will be risk reducing only under specific conditions which are not easily executable as 
regulatory rules, the full benefits may not be observed in practice. As we will discuss, this 
divergence between theory and reality will affect the empirical relationship between capital 
and crisis risk. 
There are two types of theoretical studies that focus on bank capital, portfolio based 
approaches and models that focus on the specific relationships between banking firms, 
depositors and borrowers. Both approaches are reconcilable in that they suggest capital will 
mitigate banks’ systematic risk exposures but by allowing for deliberate risk taking by bank 
managers they predict limited beneficial effects. 
Standard portfolio theory suggests that a portfolio consisting of sufficiently large numbers of 
uncorrelated asset returns will require no capital buffers due to perfect diversification. In 
reality bank portfolios will be imperfectly diversified and thus contain enough systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk to justify the need for capital buffers. Using the terminology of Freixas and 
Rochet (2008) we can define the regulators’ problem. The objective is to set a desired bank 
solvency probability and then derive the appropriate capital ratio which hinges on the bank’s 
asset exposures and their correlations. 
 Let  be the probability of solvency so that 1   is the failure rate. Each bank will have 
exposures (  ) to creditor  and this exposure is subject to a (stochastic) loss per dollar of 
exposure defined as 	. Let 
 be the aggregate loss on a portfolio of  assets. The total loss 
on the portfolio is then given by 
∑ 	

  
                                                           1    
To avoid bankruptcy, sufficient capital ( ) must be held such that 
   does not occur. In 
terms of regulatory capital ratios ( ), this insolvency condition can be re-expressed as  
 


∑
    

∑
                                             2 
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The regulator can now set  such that  
     1                                               3         
As Gordy (2003) suggests, bank portfolios of consumer loans may be granulated enough to 
diversify away considerable amounts of idiosyncratic risk but because borrower numbers are 
finite whilst exposures to different asset classes are not uniform, some residual risk will 
remain. For example, banks often have concentrated exposures to residential or commercial 
real estate subjecting them to significant sectoral risks.  
To ensure (3) is satisfied, two conditions must hold: a minimum level of diversification and 
only one common systematic risk factor across all assets. For internationally diversified 
portfolios the common factor necessarily becomes the global business cycle. Since Basel II 
and III rely on these assumptions, capital ratios will only mitigate crises by protecting against 
systematic risk arising from global business cycle downturns (Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson, 2010); domestic macroeconomic shocks are not accommodated so capital ratios 
may often be biased downwards. This has implications for the empirical link between capital 
and crisis risk. In countries where the roots of crises lay in common external events, capital is 
more likely to exert its desired effect; the effect of capital on crisis probability should be 
negative and significant. In cases where crises were caused by local (or even regional) 
factors, the portfolio approach suggests the empirical relationship may not hold because 
corresponding buffers against were not priced in. 
In Diamond and Rajan (2000) capital becomes important when uncertainty over asset prices 
is introduced. Under certainty, depositors can verify assets values so any attempt by the 
banker to squeeze rents from depositors leads to bank runs. This commitment device ensures 
banks always refund depositors fully so pure deposit financing is optimal. 
In uncertain environments, depositors who observe a decline in asset prices are unable to 
verify true values and run on the bank due to sequential service constraints. This could occur 
due to market forces (systematic risk), idiosyncratic risk or opportunistic behaviour by banks 
(deliberate imperfect diversification). To avoid failure, banks prefer partial finance with a 
softer claim, “capital”, since this allows them to renegotiate with capital providers and refund 
deposits fully when asset prices fall, thus avoiding bank runs.  Hence theoretically, capital 
protects against both risk types. 
In practice however, capital ratios independent of asset risk will generate moral hazard since 
banks will reshuffle their portfolios to accept higher risk (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Mausser 
and Rosen, 2007). Even under risk contingent capital rules, banks may imperfectly diversify, 
decreasing the size of the portfolio but concentrating risk4 via asset substitution. Moreover, 
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 This allocative inefficiency is possible if local shocks damage returns; as discussed 
previously the reliance on a common global business cycle implies correct weights will then 
not obtain in practice.  
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once limited liability (deposit insurance) exists, Rochet (1992) shows that risk based capital 
rules cannot eliminate moral hazard. Hence whilst capital theoretically reduces crisis risk, in 
practice this effect will be subject to the practices of the banking system and the institutional 
framework it operates under. Hence the expected negative relationship between capital 
adequacy and crisis probability may not always hold empirically.  
 
2.2 Liquidity Risk and Banking Crises 
Liquidity is important for bank stability from two perspectives: the funding side and the 
market’s assessment of banks asset quality. The two channels are strongly linked in that 
deteriorations of asset prices can compromise a bank’s ability to raise funds in the market. At 
the same time, acceptance of this liquidity risk is an inherent part of banks’ activities as 
qualitative asset transformers in the process of providing liquidity insurance to depositors. 
In the seminal papers of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks are modelled 
as liquidity insurance providers.  Assuming depositors are risk-averse, banks are risk neutral 
and in the face of potential liquidity shocks, the Pareto-optimal allocation of endowment 
occurs when depositors allocate funds to banks under a fractional reserve system. This 
outcome dominates autarky and bond market allocations but results in an inherently unstable 
situation since banks must invest in illiquid projects whilst maintaining solvency under the 
assumption that in aggregate, withdrawals will satisfy a known probability (the likelihood of 
a liquidity shock). However, if a patient depositor anticipates other depositors will withdraw, 
she is also forced (in the absence of liquidity shocks) to withdraw, since early liquidation of 
illiquid projects means banks’ asset values are less than its liabilities.  
Withdrawal of funds due to a lack of co-ordination amongst depositors leads to an inefficient 
allocation via bank runs which are associated with systemic banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998) and strongly dependent on expectations. This latter channel creates 
the possibility of contagion when lenders observe a run on one bank and update their beliefs 
about the liquidity position of another (potentially “sound”) bank, which they then subject to 
a run.  
Whilst policymakers attempt to mitigate contagious crises through the provision of deposit 
insurance, the increasing reliance of banks on short-term wholesale funding means liquidity 
risk remains systemically pernicious. In this context, endogeneity becomes important both 
from the perspective of asset prices and also herding amongst systemically important 
institutions.  
Huang and Ratnovski s (2010) show that wholesale lenders rely on noisy public signals of 
banks’ quality which they may disregard or enact upon to withdraw funding. In the latter 
case, monitoring is inadequate and early bank liquidation is sub-optimal. Withdrawals of 
wholesale financing may illicit fire sales whereby deleveraging results in rapid depreciation 
of asset prices. In turn, credit is further rationed (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011) and 
liquidity risk propagates systemically via the markets (Perotti and Suarez, 2009). 
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In summary, the crisis risk reducing roles of capital and liquidity are developed in the 
theoretical literature. Empirically this association has been confirmed for OECD economies 
over the last 30 years (Barrell et. al., 2010) but requires testing for Asian and Latin American 
banking systems. We discuss the data and methodologies we use to do this in the next 
section. 
 
Section 3: Data, the Event Study and Logit Methodologies and the ROC Curve 
Approach 
 
3.1 Data 
Our data covers the years 1980 – 2010 for eight Latin American and six Asian economies: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Whilst this country selection is dictated by 
data availability, it covers the major crisis incidents in both regions. 
Our main variables of interest, capital and liquidity, have not been widely used as EWS 
inputs most probably due to lack of data. Of the two, capital poses the greatest problem since 
even for developed countries there is a lack of internationally comparable reporting prior to 
1980. Barrell et. al. (2010) utilised capital adequacy ratios obtained for OECD countries but 
even OECD data coverage limited the sample to 14 countries for the post-1980 years. Outside 
the OECD, country coverage is much worse; for emerging market economies especially, 
international financial institutions such as the IMF or World Bank do not list capital adequacy 
data consistently before 19985. 
In order to examine the role of capital in emerging market crises, we were required to 
construct a dataset for regulatory capital. Whilst regulators may not have appreciated the 
importance of capital ratio data during the 1980s, the banking industry itself understood the 
central role capital plays in bank health and thus continually surveyed this variable. We 
exploit this fact by utilising an industry publication, “The Banker” which has an international 
focus. The Banker has annually surveyed the top 1000 banks in the world since 1989 and the 
top 500 global banks from 1980 – 1989. We use the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
Regulatory Capital Ratios reported by the Banker to construct our regulatory capital 
variable6.  
The BIS Capital Ratio is a comparable measure across banks that were required to calculate 
capital adequacy according to BIS rules. However coverage may be an issue because not all 
banks in our emerging market countries will have entered the top 1000 global bank list. 
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 Capital ratios start to be systematically reported by the IMF in their Global Financial Stability Reports from 
1998 onwards, possibly in response the Asian and Latin American crises which would have highlighted the lack 
of available data for analysis. 
6
 The Banker data is not available electronically for our sample of interest and hence manual transcription of 
the BIS ratios was required. 
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Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that where a bank did enter the list, it would have 
been systemically important (in the “too-big-to-fail” sense) and thus its capital ratio would be 
correlated with the health of the financial system. Hence although our capital data may not 
contain all the variance associated with a particular banking system, it should be broadly 
representative of its capital soundness. Full details of the bank coverage for each country are 
given in the data appendix7. 
From 1998 onwards, we revert to the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Reports to obtain 
capital adequacy ratios for the entire banking system. Like The Banker, these data are risk 
weighted according to BIS regulatory requirements. The final variable we construct can be 
described as: 
Capital charge = EA x RW x GCR      (4) 
where EA = amount of exposure; RW = risk weight of exposure and GCR = general capital 
requirement. 
In comparison to capital ratios, liquidity data is easier to obtain although it also needs to be 
constructed. We use the Barrell et. al. (2010) definition of liquidity 
 
 (5) 
 
which we construct from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. This is a 
narrow liquidity definition because of the exclusion of claims on the private sector. During 
the Asian crises, capital flight would have reduced the marketability of corporate securities, 
rendering them illiquid. Hence a narrow liquidity measure is more representative of the 
liquidity position of banks during crises. 
The remaining variables that enter our EWS are the more traditional set of determinants (see 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Davis and Karim, 2008): domestic credit/ GDP, 
exchange rate, real GDP growth, terms of trade, inflation, budget balance/ GDP, real 
domestic credit growth, GDP per capita, current account balance/ GDP and M2/ foreign 
exchange reserves. These data were obtained from the IMF and World Bank.  
Our dependent variable is constructed as a binary series such that a value of one represents 
the occurrence of a systemic crisis whilst a value of zero indicates no crisis has taken place.  
To date our crises, we rely on Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) where a systemic 
crisis is recorded if one or more of the following conditions pertain in a given year: non-
performing loans/ total banking system assets exceeded 10%, or public bailout costs 
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 For Panama, The Banker provides no data. For this country we relied on IMF Global Financial Stability Reports 
and IMF Country Reports.  
cash + reserves + claims on (central bank + government)Liquidity Ratio = 
total assets
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exceeded 2% of GDP, or systemic crisis caused large scale bank nationalisation, or extensive 
bank runs were visible and if not, emergency government intervention occurred.  
Based on these criteria, our dependent variable contains 23 systemic crisis episodes; 14 of 
which occurred in Latin America and 9 in Asia. A concentration of crises occurs in the early 
1980s (predominantly in Latin America), the early to mid 1990s (Latin America) and the late 
1990s (Asia). Only 2 crises occur after 1998 (Argentina and Uruguay) and none occur after 
2002.   
Once a crisis ensues it will impact on the explanatory variables either directly or due to 
associated policy responses. To remove this endogeneity we use the crisis onset only (see 
Barrell et. al., 2010). In addition, each explanatory variable in the logit model is lagged to 
further address this issue. The distribution of crises is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Systemic Crises Based on Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) Dating 
  80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
ARG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MEX 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PER 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
URU 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
VEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MEX 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PHI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
THA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Data shown up to 2003 only; there are no crises after 2002. ARG=Argentina; BRA=Brazil; CHI=Chile; 
MEX=Mexico; PAN=Panama; PER=Peru; URU=Uruguay; VEN=Venezuela; IND=Indonesia; KOR=Korea; 
MEX=Mexico; PHI=Philippines; SIN=Singapore; THA=Thailand 
 
3.2 The Event Study Approach 
Event studies were initially used to establish whether share prices generated abnormal returns 
following a pre-defined event (Fama et.al., 1969). The event methodology lent itself to crisis 
investigation and has subsequently been used by Eichengreen et. al. (1995), Frankel and Rose 
(1996) and Aziz et. al. (2000) for currency crises and Manasse et. al. (2003) for sovereign 
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debt crises. There have been relatively few event studies on banking crises, Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld (2012) being a recent exception8. 
An event study is a univariate graphical approach which tracks how a variable behaves 
around the time of an event (crisis). This behaviour can then be compared to non-tranquil 
times to see if the crisis is associated with significantly aberrant behaviour, in which case the 
variable may be an informative crisis predictor. In this sense, the approach is not dissimilar to 
the signal extraction approach used to underpin the Basel II rules on capital and therefore, 
suffers from a lack of variable interactions. Nevertheless, as a first approach event studies are 
informative because unlike signal extraction (which is non-parametric), confidence intervals 
can be used to judge significant abnormality of the variable. 
Assuming the vent occurs at time t, an “event window” can be defined as the temporal space: 
"#  3,… #, … # & 3'. This three year pre and post crisis window is similar to Manasse et. al. 
(2003) and Hemming et. al. (2003), although five years can be used (Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld, 2012). Then for county  and variable (, the behaviour of () conditional on the 
temporal distance from # can be computed: ()|"#  3,… #,… # & 3'. This behaviour can 
then be compared against the reference behaviour of () outside the event window: 
()|"#  ,… #  4, # & 4,… # & '. Confidence intervals are used to establish whether the 
behaviour of () during crises is significantly different from tranquil periods. 
 
3.3 The Logit Approach 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) first used the multivariate logit estimator to relate the 
probabilities of systemic banking crises to a vector of explanatory variables. The banking 
crisis dependent variable, a binary banking crisis dummy, is defined in terms of observable 
stresses to a country’s banking system, e.g. ratio of non-performing loans to total banking 
system assets exceeds 10%.9 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) updated the banking 
crises list to include more years, and more crises. We use the same dependent variable in our 
current work. 
We use the cumulative logistic distribution which relates the probability that the dummy for 
crises takes a value of one to the logit of the vector of n explanatory variables:  
 
( ) ( )
it
it
X'
X'
itit
e1
eXF1YobPr β
β
β
+
===
                  (6)           
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 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) used event studies to examine banking crises in conjunction with currency 
crises (the so called “twin crises”). Other approaches test the difference in bank share returns around crises. 
9
 Their actual criteria are: the proportion of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeded 10%, 
or the public bailout cost exceeded 2% of GDP, or systemic crisis caused large scale bank nationalisation, or 
extensive bank runs were visible and if not, emergency government intervention was visible. 
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where Yit is the banking crisis dummy for country i at time t, β is the vector of coefficients, 
Xit is the vector of explanatory variables and F(β Xit) is the cumulative logistic distribution. 
The log likelihood function which is used to obtain actual parameter estimates is given by:  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]∑∑
= =
−−+=
n
i
T
t
iteititeite XFYXFYLLog
1 1
'1log1'log ββ                                          (7) 
   
Although the signs on the coefficients are easily interpreted as representing an increasing or 
decreasing effect on crisis probability, the marginal values are not as intuitive to interpret. 
Equation (2) shows the coefficients on Xit are not constant marginal effects of the variable on 
banking crisis probability since the variable’s effect is conditional on the values of all other 
explanatory variables at time t. Rather, the coefficient ßi represents the effect of Xi when all 
other variables are held at their sample means. The logistic EWS has the benefit of being 
easily replicable by policy makers concerned with potential systemic risk in their countries. 
Unlike many extant studies which use contemporaneous independent variables (e.g. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 2005), we lag all independent variables so as to 
obtain a valid EWS (see Barrell et. al, 2010). We also test down from a general equation with 
all variables included to the simplest equation with all remaining significant variables. At 
each stage of the testing down procedure we assess the loss of predictive ability of the 
resulting model using a ROC analysis (see Section 3.4).  
 
3.4 ROC Curves 
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves test the “skill” of binary classifiers and hence 
can be used to discriminate between competing models. In the context of logit estimators, 
probabilistic forecasts can be classified for accuracy against a continuum of thresholds. This 
generates a true positive rate and true negative rate for each threshold and correspondingly a 
false positive and false negative rate. In the terminology of ROC analysis, the two variables 
of interest are: sensitivity (true positive rate) and 1 – specificity (i.e. 1 – the true negative rate, 
which is equal to the false negative rate). Sensitivity is plotted on the y-axes and 1 – 
specificity on the x- axes, as shown in Figure 1.  
The true positive and false negative rates encapsulate the correspondence between 
probabilistic forecasts and actual binary events and generate a two dimensional co-ordinate in 
the ROC space. In turn, the mapping between these co-ordinates and the thresholds (or 
decision criterion), define the ROC curve. Hence ROC curves are closely associated with the 
“power” of a binary predictor10. 
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 In practice, the ROC curve is rarely “smooth” as drawn in Figure 1 since the relationship between the true 
positive and false negative rates to the threshold is not necessarily monotonic over the range of thresholds.   
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ROC curves have been widely used in medical research and are considered to be the most 
comprehensive measure of diagnostic accuracy available11. This is because they impound all 
combinations of sensitivity and specificity that the diagnostic test can provide as the decision 
criterion varies (Metz, 2006). Since false positive and false negative errors have very 
different costs in clinical terms, evaluating a predictor based solely on true positive rates can 
be inefficient. Similarly, in the context of early warning systems for crisis prediction, these 
two errors will have different social consequences; an EWS that has a high level of sensitivity 
at the cost of high false negative rates may lead to “tail events” being missed with 
commensurate economic costs.  
Since the true positive and false negative rates are functions of the threshold, a policy 
makers’ risk attitude to crises may influence the choice of threshold and thus optimal model. 
Moreover once this optimal threshold is selected, an increase or decrease in the prevalence of 
crises will not affect the true positive or false negative rates. Thus the ranking of models 
based on ROC curves will vary depending on the chosen threshold range which in turn is a 
function of the policy maker’s preferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves 
 
To separate out preferences from the decision making process, an alternative but related 
“global” measure of model skill can be used to select between competing models: the Area 
Under the Curve (AUC).  This evaluates a model over all possible thresholds and thus avoids 
the ranking of models at particular thresholds. An AUC of 0.5 is equivalent to a “naïve” 
estimator that replicates a random coin toss (corresponding to the 450 line) so an AUC above 
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 For a recent example of ROC curve usage in the context of crises, see Schularick and Taylor (2012). 
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0.5 implies the model adds value in terms of both the ability to call crises correctly and low 
false negative rates.  
 
 
Table 2: Area Under the Curve (AUC) and Model Skill 
AUC = 0.5 No discrimination (equivalent to coin toss) 
0.7 ≤ AUC < 0.8 Acceptable discrimination 
0.8 ≤ AUC < 0.9 Excellent discrimination 
AUC ≥ 0.9 
Outstanding discrimination (not possible in logit 
frameworks) 
Source: Hosmer and Lemeshow, (2000) 
 
Table 2 indicates discrimination performance in terms of the AUC. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(2000) indicate that an AUC ≥ 0.9 is highly improbable for logit models since this level of 
discrimination would require complete separation of the crisis and non-crisis event, implying 
that the logit coefficients could not be estimated. Hence for our EWS approach we would 
accept models with AUCs ≥ 0.7. The AUCs for our competing models are given in the 
general to specific results. 
 
Section 4: Results 
In this section we initially present the results from our event study analysis which at a 
graphical level identifies the variables that showed significant deviance around crises. We 
then present our empirical results from the general to specific approach in a logit framework. 
Conclusions from this approach, which is standard in the extant literature, are then discussed 
in the light of our ROC curve results. This reveals that there may be a trade-off between an 
EWS model’s simplicity (and thus its usefulness as a policy tool) and predictive accuracy 
since an increase in the latter may come at the cost of increased monitoring. Recognition of 
this trade-off will improve future EWS design. 
 
4.1 Event Study Results 
Panels 1 to 6 below show the event studies for each of our variables in the cases of pooled 
samples and then split samples. Each graph compares the variable behaviour in the abnormal 
period (bold line) against its average behaviour in tranquil periods (dashed grey line). The 
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vertical line at time # indicates the crisis event. We use 95% confidence intervals (dotted 
lines) to assess significant deviations: if the bold line containing the crisis episodes moves 
outside the confidence interval, the respective variable behaves significantly different during 
the event window.  
 
Capital Adequacy (panel 1): The capital adequacy results for our pooled sample reveal banks’ 
capital buffers were significantly and abnormally low prior to crises. Indeed, for the entire 3 
year pre-crisis window, capital positions were worse than the non-crisis mean (9.23%) but 
this deterioration became significant during the crisis when capital adequacy fell to 7.3%, 
below the regulatory minimum of 8%, during the actual crises.  
The regional results reveal the source of this capital inadequacy: for Latin American banks, 
the average tranquil level of capital stood at 10.1%, above the regulatory minimum. However 
crises in these economies were characterised by sudden declines in buffers a year before 
crisis when the level dropped to 7.78%. This suggests that asset write-offs were problematic 
at this time and since capital levels 3 years before crisis stood at only 8.8%, banks would 
have been vulnerable to the deteriorations in asset quality. 
In the context of Asia, the tranquil period average level of capital stood at 8.08%, effectively 
at the regulatory floor. Nevertheless, the reductions in capital observed from 2 years prior to 
crises (down to 6.8%) were not significantly different from this regulatory minimum, 
suggesting that at this stage, Asian banks could accommodate rising non-performing loans. 
However within a year of crisis onset, this situation reversed; the capital level of 5.72% one 
year afterwards is significantly below the non-crisis mean and suggests that buffers were no 
longer able to accommodate the depth of the Asian crises. 
The results suggest that a lack of capital adequacy was a pre-crisis problem in Latin America 
as opposed to Asia. We would thus expect that if our capital variable was to act as an early 
warning indicator, it would be relevant to Latin American crises. 
 
Liquidity (panel 1): The pooled sample results which track banks’ liquidity positions show a 
dramatic deterioration of liquid assets 3 years prior to crises. The tranquil period average 
liquidity ratio was 26% yet liquidity remained significantly below this level during the entire 
pre-crisis window. The worst deterioration occurred one year before crises began when 
liquidity stood at 16.7%. 
A regional analysis shows Asia to be the main source of this vulnerability. In Latin America, 
banks held 28% of their assets in liquid form on average. This level started to decline 
significantly 3 years prior to crises so that by the pre-crisis year the ratio stood at 19.8%. 
However in the immediate run-up to crisis, Latin American banks appear to have shored up 
their liquidity positions such that at crisis commencement their liquidity ratios were not 
significantly different from their pre-crisis levels. This upward trend continued; within 1 year 
of crisis onset the liquidity ratio of 33% actually stood above its tranquil period average. 
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PANEL 1: 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY (%) 
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PANEL 2: 
DOMESTIC CREDIT/ GDP 
                                POOLED                                                                               LATIN AMERICA                                                ASIA 
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          PANEL 3:     
CURRENT ACCOUNT (% GDP) 
    POOLED                                                                               LATIN AMERICA                                                            ASIA 
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PANEL 4: 
BUDGET BALANCE (% GDP) 
                               POOLED                                                                           LATIN AMERICA                                                                          ASIA 
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PANEL 5: 
INFLATION (%) 
                                                  POOLED                                                              LATIN AMERICA                                                              ASIA 
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          PANEL 6: 
         GDP GROWTH (%) 
                              POOLED                                                                     LATIN AMERICA                                                        ASIA 
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In the case of Asia, the liquidity position of banks was far more critical. Even during non-
crisis periods the average liquidity ratio was 23.4%, below the Latin American average of 
28%. Moreover in Asia, the decline was more protracted; even 3 years before crisis the 
starting level of liquidity was only 18% and persistent significant declines thereafter resulted 
in a ratio of 1.3% at crisis onset. 
These patterns accord with the chronology of Asian crises events where significant capital 
outflows resulting from a “flight to quality” left banks without access to financing. This may 
explain the post-crisis relapse in liquidity positions; although they temporarily improved 1 
year after crisis onset, by the following year, Asian banks’ liquidity ratios again fell 
significantly below their tranquil period levels. Hence liquidity ratios are a potential leading 
indicator for Asian crises but are less likely to be so in the case of Latin America. 
Domestic Credit/ GDP; M2/Reserves; Current Account/ GDP (Panels 2 and 3): Some 
variables we examine do not display anomalous behaviour during the pre-crisis windows; 
although there are deviations from the non-crisis mean in several cases, most of these are not 
especially significant in terms of the confidence intervals.  Exceptions include domestic 
credit/ GDP, the current account and M2/ reserves. 
The rises in domestic credit/ GDP in the pooled sample show credit intermediation expanded 
above its tranquil period average (49.6%) during all 3 pre-crisis years. This expansion falls 
outside the upper confidence level 2 years before crisis onset, peaking at 62.9%. The pooled 
results are attributable to Latin American banks’ lending activity where balance sheets 
expanded; credit/ GDP remained elevated in the run-up to crises rising to 51% compared to a 
non-crisis average of 37%. In Asia, although the tranquil period mean (66.2%) was higher 
than Latin America, credit expansion relative to income did not significantly differ in the run 
up to crises.  
In line with the expansion of Latin American banking intermediation, M2/ reserves also 
increased significantly. Whereas the non-crisis mean level was 4.2%, the pre-crisis level 
peaked at 10.2%. However this deviation was not persistent; a rapid post-crisis correction 
meant the M2/ reserves ratio fell below the tranquil average within a year of crisis onset. This 
correction is not observed for domestic credit/ GDP in Latin America. In Asia, a relatively 
minor aberration of M2/ reserves is observable close to crisis onset but the correction was 
rapid. 
On the other hand, the current account deficit behaved significantly worse in Asia than in 
Latin America. This generates the trends observed in the pooled sample where the current 
account remains well below the tranquil average in all 3 pre-crisis years. Whilst current 
accounts worsened in Latin America the deviations were not significantly different from the 
non-crisis mean of -1.26%. In contrast, the deficit was markedly worse in Asia where the 
tranquil period was associated with a 2.5% surplus. Relative to this baseline, Asia’s 
imbalances rose for all 3 years before crisis onset. These significant deviations caused the 
deficit to dip to 5% of GDP 2 years before the crises erupted with commensurate effects on 
the balance of payments.  
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4.2 Logit Results 
Having identified different potential leading crisis indicators for Latin America and Asia 
using the event study methodology, we next discuss our results for the general to specific 
logit exercise. The logit results can be used to assess the relative leading indicator qualities of 
competing variables where the sign on the coefficient indicates whether an in increase in the 
value of the variable reduces the probability of crisis or not.  
Tables 3 to 5 display the testing down procedure for the pooled and separated samples. A 
priori we make no assumptions abut the relative importance of variables as leading indicators 
hence we start with all variables and iteratively remove the least significant at each stage. 
Although we do not assume statistical differences between the two regions, we conduct 
separate exercises for Latin America and Asia and test whether the results are significantly 
different. 
The pooled sample results (Table 3) show 9 sequential variable deletions culminating in a 3 
variable equation. The final specification is the most parsimonious model that can be used to 
explain systemic banking crises across Latin America and Asia. The variable deletions 
themselves are of interest since they suggest changes in domestic credit growth, GDP growth, 
inflation, GDP per capita and M2/forex reserves do not significantly affect crisis 
probabilities. These results contrast with those of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998; 
2005) who found these variables to be associated with emerging market crises, albeit 
contemporaneously12.  
Some of these differences may be attributable to our inclusion of capital and liquidity which 
remain untested in the extant literature on these regions. The final pooled specification 
suggests the most important determinants of combined Latin American and Asian crises are: 
the terms of trade, changes in domestic credit/ GDP and bank capital adequacy. An 
improvement in the terms of trade and capital soundness of banks reduces the likelihood of 
systemic bank failures while an increase domestic credit relative to income raises the failure 
probability. 
The event study approach highlighted these variables as indicators of financial instability 
albeit with different regional importance. Although we have made no assumptions regarding 
regional differences in crises, and thus their causes, we expect divergences to exist given the  
 
 
 
                                                            
12
 Credit growth was the only variable to be lagged (by two periods) in their specifications. 
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Table 3: General to Specific Results for Pooled Sample 
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Terms of trade(-1) 
-0.013    
(0.029) 
-0.013    
(0.029) 
-0.014    
(0.024) 
-0.015    
(0.012) 
-0.016    
(0.007) 
-0.018    
(0.001) 
-0.019    
(0.001) 
-0.023    
(0) 
-0.02          
(0) 
-0.019    
(0) 
∆ Domestic Credit/ GDP(-1) 
0.049    
(0.051) 
0.049    
(0.051) 
0.049    
(0.052) 
0.049    
(0.056) 
0.053    
(0.031) 
0.055    
(0.026) 
0.053    
(0.034) 
0.052    
(0.03) 
0.065    
(0.005) 
0.069    
(0.002) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio(-1) 
-0.132    
(0.041) 
-0.132    
(0.041) 
-0.135    
(0.035) 
-0.147    
(0.02) 
-0.142    
(0.021) 
-0.131    
(0.024) 
-0.141    
(0.019) 
-0.153    
(0.007) 
-0.142    
(0.01) 
-0.145    
(0.006) 
Current Account Balance (% 
of GDP)(-1) 
-0.06    
(0.261) 
-0.06    
(0.261) 
-0.054    
(0.285) 
-0.062    
(0.2) 
-0.06    
(0.208) 
-0.069    
(0.152) 
-0.079    
(0.09) 
-0.081    
(0.079) 
-0.084    
(0.07)   
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves(-
1) 
0.048    
(0.231) 
0.048    
(0.231) 
0.047    
(0.247) 
0.046    
(0.261) 
0.049    
(0.232) 
0.049    
(0.232) 
0.064    
(0.102) 
0.072    
(0.092)   
Liquidity Ratio(-1) 
-0.035    
(0.061) 
-0.035    
(0.061) 
-0.035    
(0.062) 
-0.035    
(0.055) 
-0.033    
(0.063) 
-0.034    
(0.055) 
-0.025    
(0.107)   
Budget Balance (% of GDP)(-
1) 
-0.092    
(0.379) 
-0.092    
(0.379) 
-0.103    
(0.306) 
-0.108    
(0.273) 
-0.111    
(0.259) 
-0.11    
(0.271)   
Exchange Rate(-1) 
0      
(0.434) 
0     
(0.434) 
0     
(0.427) 
0     
(0.441) 
0     
(0.444)   
Inflation(-1) 
0     
(0.599) 
0     
(0.599) 
0        
(0.54) 
0     
(0.508)   
GDP per Capita(-1) 
0     
(0.557) 
0     
(0.557) 
0     
(0.559)   
∆GDP(-1) 
-0.019    
(0.723) 
-0.019    
(0.723)   
∆ Domestic Credit(-1) 
0     
(0.984)   
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 401 402 402 402 402 
Note: p-values in parentheses  
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. Table 4: General to Specific Results for Asia 
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Current Account Balance (% 
of GDP)(-1) 
-0.201    
(0.131) 
-0.211    
(0.108) 
-0.224    
(0.084) 
-0.242    
(0.062) 
-0.207    
(0.06) 
-0.195    
(0.04) 
-0.197    
(0.036) 
-0.199    
(0.036) 
-0.189    
(0.036) 
-0.194    
(0.012) 
Liquidity Ratio(-1) 
-0.075    
(0.209) 
-0.072    
(0.214) 
-0.088    
(0.053) 
-0.082    
(0.052) 
-0.079    
(0.054) 
-0.064    
(0.051) 
-0.063    
(0.051) 
-0.065    
(0.038) 
-0.071    
(0.025) 
-0.063    
(0.041) 
Terms of trade(-1) 
-0.019    
(0.344) 
-0.014    
(0.304) 
-0.017    
(0.157) 
-0.019    
(0.131) 
-0.02    
(0.092) 
-0.018    
(0.081) 
-0.016    
(0.059) 
-0.017    
(0.025) 
-0.016    
(0.026) 
-0.021    
(0) 
GDP per Capita(-1) 
0    
(0.305) 
0    
(0.303) 
0    
(0.189) 
0    
(0.229) 
0    
(0.26) 
0    
(0.343) 
0    
(0.331) 
0    
(0.354) 
0    
(0.331)   
Budget Balance (% of GDP)(-
1) 
0.337    
(0.411) 
0.377    
(0.338) 
0.322    
(0.383) 
0.305    
(0.4) 
0.277    
(0.44) 
0.203    
(0.454) 
0.179    
(0.489) 
0.182    
(0.484)     
Inflation(-1) 
-0.083    
(0.548) 
-0.084    
(0.514) 
-0.103    
(0.419) 
-0.134    
(0.27) 
-0.109    
(0.317) 
-0.03    
(0.668) 
-0.021    
(0.731)       
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves(-
1) 
0.217    
(0.297) 
0.214    
(0.291) 
0.224    
(0.273) 
0.213    
(0.286) 
0.205    
(0.298) 
0.063    
(0.699)         
∆ Domestic Credit(-1) 
0    
(0.352) 
0    
(0.353) 
0    
(0.284) 
0    
(0.385) 
0    
(0.468)           
∆ Domestic Credit/ GDP(-1) 
-0.046    
(0.506) 
-0.046    
(0.503) 
-0.05    
(0.459) 
-0.037    
(0.584)             
Exchange Rate(-1) 
0    
(0.543) 
0    
(0.563) 
0    
(0.559)               
Capital Adequacy Ratio(-1) 
-0.08    
(0.74) 
-0.097    
(0.672)                 
∆GDP(-1) 
0.059    
(0.745)                   
Area Under Curve (AUC) 0.713 0.759 0.837 0.837 0.838 0.829 0.817 0.821 0.808 0.807 
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 177 178 178 179 
Note: p-values in parentheses  
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Table 5: General to Specific Results for Latin America 
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Capital Adequacy Ratio(-1) 
-0.136    
(0.139) 
-0.136    
(0.137) 
-0.134    
(0.139) 
-0.124    
(0.117) 
-0.125    
(0.103) 
-0.122    
(0.11) 
-0.117    
(0.096) 
-0.157    
(0.003) 
-0.18    
(0) 
-0.219    
(0) 
Liquidity Ratio(-1) 
-0.032    
(0.237) 
-0.032    
(0.237) 
-0.031    
(0.237) 
-0.027    
(0.209) 
-0.028    
(0.175) 
-0.03    
(0.156) 
-0.033    
(0.098) 
-0.041    
(0.023) 
-0.039    
(0.026) 
-0.047    
(0.008) 
∆ Domestic Credit/ GDP(-1) 
0.056    
(0.151) 
0.056    
(0.151) 
0.059    
(0.151) 
0.057    
(0.055) 
0.062    
(0.034) 
0.063    
(0.031) 
0.07    
(0.012) 
0.072    
(0.011) 
0.071    
(0.013) 
0.062    
(0.022) 
Exchange Rate(-1) 
-0.123    
(0.306) 
-0.123    
(0.306) 
-0.127    
(0.306) 
-0.115    
(0.285) 
-0.106    
(0.296) 
-0.102    
(0.311) 
-0.104    
(0.278) 
-0.14    
(0.118) 
-0.136    
(0.145)   
∆GDP(-1) 
-0.081    
(0.34) 
-0.081    
(0.34) 
-0.083    
(0.34) 
-0.086    
(0.303) 
-0.064    
(0.382) 
-0.048    
(0.456) 
-0.053    
(0.408) 
-0.067    
(0.281)     
Terms of trade(-1) 
-0.011    
(0.406) 
-0.011    
(0.406) 
-0.011    
(0.406) 
-0.009    
(0.37) 
-0.009    
(0.334) 
-0.009    
(0.341) 
-0.006    
(0.443)       
M2 Money/ Forex Reserves(-
1) 
0.037    
(0.402) 
0.037    
(0.402) 
0.038    
(0.402) 
0.039    
(0.371) 
0.034    
(0.426) 
0.03    
(0.463)         
Current Account Balance (% 
of GDP)(-1) 
-0.036    
(0.649) 
-0.036    
(0.649) 
-0.036    
(0.649) 
-0.045    
(0.548) 
-0.035    
(0.625)           
Budget Balance (% of GDP)(-
1) 
0.142    
(0.617) 
0.142    
(0.617) 
0.146    
(0.617) 
0.157    
(0.576)             
GDP per Capita(-1) 
0    
(0.773) 
0    
(0.773) 
0    
(0.773)               
Inflation(-1) 
0    
(0.874) 
0    
(0.875)                 
∆ Domestic Credit(-1) 
0    
(0.996)                   
Area Under Curve (AUC) 0.677 0.677 0.678 0.687 0.670 0.659 0.662 0.659 0.648 0.610 
Observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Note: p-values in parentheses  
 
variations in banking system activity, institutional and policy frameworks as well as the 
openness to financial and trade flows. We therefore repeat the general to specific exercise on 
separate regions. The results show marked differences in crises determinants between Latin 
America and Asia. These differences are statistically significant: when we test the pooling 
assumption (under a null of no significant difference between the regions) we obtain an F-
statistic of 2.91 versus a critical value of 2.32 (at 1% significance). 
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Table 4 shows the competing models for the Asian economies. In contrast to the pooled 
results, elevated domestic credit/ GDP and insufficient capital adequacy do not appear to 
precede crises. Instead, the current account balance, terms of trade and liquidity ratios are 
important crisis predictors. These effects appear robust in that the coefficients remain fairly 
stable through nine rounds of variable deletions.  
The results accord with the chronology of the Asian crises: triggered by a reduction in 
demand for the region’s exports, current account imbalances financed by speculative capital 
inflows and deteriorating bank liquidity positions once these inflows revered. The results are 
also in line with the event studies which identified significant anomalies in liquidity and 
current accounts in the pre-crisis window. 
Liquidity ratios have become a target variable under Basel III and based on Asia’s crisis 
history, regulation of this variable may be beneficial for regional financial stability. However 
the absence of capital adequacy from the final specification suggest the more stringent capital 
rules of Basel III are unlikely to yield the benefits available to OECD economies where 
capital inadequacy had a more obvious crisis generating role. 
In contrast, Table 5 shows unhealthy capital positions are a crisis determinant in Latin 
America. Moreover, banks in this region held inadequate liquidity provisions at a time when 
the growth in bank expansion surpassed increases in income as a result of liberalisation 
policies. The lack of accompanying prudential regulation allowed banks in these regions to 
operate without adequate capital buffers and diverse sources of funding.  
The introduction of capital and liquidity in the Latin America model relegates variables such 
as domestic credit growth, exchange rates and fiscal balances in terms of their leading 
indicator properties. Although these variables have connections to individual crises (e.g. 
Mexico and Argentina) it appears that they cannot explain broad crises classes as well as 
capital and liquidity. The event study approach also identified anomalies in capital soundness 
and credit/ GDP in this region although on a univariate basis, liquidity appeared to be less of 
a concern. 
Hence in Latin America, increases in capital soundness and liquidity ratios should reduce the 
probability of future crises as would a focus on prudential supervision13. In this context, Latin 
America may benefit from the adoption of the Basel III framework. 
 
4.3 ROC Results 
So far, the interpretation has been in the context of leading indicators as an input to EWSs. 
From the perspective of a policy tool, the general to specific approach is useful because it 
identifies the most succinct sub-set of predictors that can be monitored to warn against 
financial instability. This reduces costs of monitoring and the chances of unnecessary policy 
                                                            
13
 It is not always been the case that highly regulated banking systems avoided crises in the region; Carstens et. 
al. (2004) point to the crisis in Peru as an example. 
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interventions based on a wider set of target variables; any set of target variables that enter the 
EWS must be scrutinised by the policy maker and are likely to be enacted upon if deviations 
become significant. 
We may however be interested in the informational content of variables that do not survive 
the general to specific deletion process. Their removal may arise from variable interactions 
we cannot capture in a linear framework so that their ability to explain idiosyncratic crises is 
lost when we rank them against more dominant competitors. In such cases, the “skill” of the 
resulting parsimonious model may be inferior to the extended version containing the deleted 
variables.  
Policy makers with a strong aversion to crises will wish to call as many episodes as possible 
even at the cost of mistaken signals; for them the cost of a Type I error (failure to call a crisis) 
is higher than the cost of a Type II error (false alarm). On the other hand, if an extended 
model contains no additional informational value, the same policy maker may prefer the 
parsimonious version, assuming costs of monitoring and intervention exist. 
Informational value therefore becomes a function of both Type I and II errors whenever there 
is a cost involved with unnecessary policy intervention. If a deleted variable lowers the Type 
I error rate without significantly raising the Type II error rate (or vice versa), the more 
stringent model will be inferior from a forecasting accuracy perspective since this accuracy is 
a function of both errors.  
We view the informational content of our competing models using ROC curves and compare 
their “skill” using the AUCs. Since we have established differences between crisis 
determinants in Latin America and Asia, we focus on regional results. Figures 2 and 3 display 
the ROC curves for competing models for Asia and Latin America respectively. 
In both regions, the graphs suggest the parsimonious models are inferior to their competitors 
when both sensitivity and specificity are taken into account (the more convex the ROC curve, 
the better the model skill). Thus the trade-off between parsimony and skill becomes important 
because variable deletions cause losses in predictive accuracy. To shed light on this trade off, 
we compute the AUC for all models. For ease of reference, these figures are presented at the 
bottom of the general to specific results in Tables 4 and 5.  
The highest AUC for Latin American models is 0.69 while the lowest value is 0.61. Referring 
to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) this implies that the worst model offers limited 
discrimination between crisis and non-crisis episodes, while the best model borders on 
acceptable discrimination (see Table 2). The Asian models are always superior in 
comparison; the highest AUC is 0.84 whilst the minimum occurs at 0.71. Hence the Asian 
EWSs generate acceptable to excellent discrimination. 
In both regions, it is also clear that the parsimonious model does not yield the highest AUC. 
The Asian model with the highest AUC is regression 5 but compared to the most 
parsimonious version it contains 5 extra target variables (GDP per capita, budget balance, 
inflation, M2/reserves and domestic credit growth). The best Latin American model is  
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Figure 2: ROC Curves for General to Specific Asia Model 
 
 Figure 3: ROC Curves for General to Specific Latin America Model 
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regression 4, which contains 6 more variables than the truncated model (budget balance, 
terms of trade, M2/reserves, current account, GDP growth and exchange rates). Given the 
increased monitoring costs that would result from using these extended models versus the 
succinct versions, we evaluate the loss in terms of crisis calls and non-crisis calls at the in-
sample threshold. These results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Comparisons of Model Accuracy 
 
Asia Latin America 
 Regression Number Equation 5 Equation 10 Equation 4 Equation 10 
AUC 0.838 0.807 0.687 0.61 
Correct Crisis Calls (%) 7/8 (89%) 8/9 (89%) 7/10 (70%) 6/10 (60%) 
Correct Non-Crisis Calls (%) 
111/170 
(65%) 
111/170 
(65%) 
129/190 
(68%) 
109/190 
(57%) 
 
In the Asian context, there is no difference between the models in terms of the ability to 
identify crises since both approaches yield a success rate of 89%. Reducing the number of 
target variables from 8 to 5 does not compromise the ability to identify non-crisis episodes 
but significantly lowers the monitoring costs for policy makers at the threshold they would 
use for an EWS. 
For Latin America, 6 additional variables are required to call one extra crisis (Argentina, 
1989) although the information they carry improves the success of non-crisis identification. 
Nevertheless, the substantial increase in monitoring costs that would arise from using the 
extended model, alongside the macroeconomic consequences of any policy changes in these 
additional instruments, may be hard to justify and should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Section 5: Conclusion 
To our knowledge, our results represent the first attempt at testing the roles of bank capital 
adequacy and liquidity in Asian and Latin American crises. Event studies, logit estimations 
and ROC curve analyses suggest these variables are valuable leading indicators of crises, 
although capital seems relevant in the Latin American context. There are significant 
differences between the regions so the pooling assumptions of extant studies should be 
addressed.  
We find no direct role for credit growth in either region. Credit/ GDP is a crisis determinant 
in Latin America where bank activity expanded when financial liberalisation was not 
accompanied by adequate prudential supervision. In Asia, crises were characterised by 
exposure to terms of trade deteriorations and reliance on short-term foreign capital flows 
without adequate liquidity protection from diversified funding sources. 
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Capital adequacy and liquidity ratios appear to supersede many “traditional” crisis 
determinants as leading indicators and can thus be used to improve EWS design for these 
regions. In this context, there are trade-offs between model simplicity, which implies less 
monitoring costs and complexity which may improve accuracy. However AUCs show that 
capital and liquidity can be used in a parsimonious model without any substantial loss in 
crisis predictive accuracy in either region. 
Our results have implications for Asian and Latin American financial regulators concerned 
with the impacts of Basel III on their banking systems. The increased capital and liquidity 
standards could have a beneficial impact in Latin America but higher capital ratios may 
unnecessarily tax Asian banks. Given that we find no direct role for credit growth, the impact 
of countercyclical capital buffers need to be evaluated in both regions. Our results provide a 
starting point for further analysis. 
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Data Appendix: 
Table A.1: Data Sources for Capital Adequacy 
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
ARGENTINA  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3)  (1)  (7)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (8)  (9)      (8) 
BOLIVIA                                     
BRAZIL  (7)  (8)  (10)  (11)  (7)  (7)  (6)  (6)  (4)  (17)    (20)  (17)  (19)  (18)  (17)      (26) 
CHILE    (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (3)    (3)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (4)      (6) 
MEXICO  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (5)  (5)  (4)  (5)    (7)  (5)  (6)  (10)  (9)      (9) 
PANAMA                    (1)    (1)    (1)  (1)  (1)      (1) 
PERU  (1)  (1)  (1)              (1)        (1)    (3)      (4) 
VENEZUELA  (5)  (4)  (4)  (3)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (1)        (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)      (2) 
INDONESIA  (2)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (2)  (6)    (9)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (13)      (13) 
KOREA  (7)  (7)  (7)  (8)  (8)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (10)  (15)    (24)  (28)  (27)  (28)  (29)      (20) 
MALAYSIA  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (4)  (4)    (5)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (9)      (16) 
PHILIPPINES  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (2)      (6)    (8)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (8)      (14) 
SINGAPORE  (2)  (2)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (3)  (3)  (5)    (5)  (6)  (6)  (6)  (6)      (6) 
THAILAND  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (9)    (12)  (11)  (10)  (12)  (12)      (9) 
LEGEND:   indicates data is available; ( ) indicates the number of banks for which data is available; missing data is obtained from IMF Global Financial Stability Reports or country reports (for Panama). 
Post 1998 data uses IMF Global Financial Stability Reports 
 
 
